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Goldman v. Weinberger. Deference or
Abdication?
I. Introduction
Goldman v. Weinberger' continues a line of individual
rights challenges in which the Supreme Court has carved out a
special niche for the military.2 By a five-to-four decision, the
Court held that the military may, without violating the first
amendment, strictly enforce a dress code provision "in the inter-
est of the military's perceived need for uniformity, '2 even
though the provision might restrict a serviceman in the free ex-
ercise of his religion.
Earlier cases employed a version of interest-balancing, typi-
cally applied to individual rights challenges in the civilian con-
text, to produce increasingly deferential statements in the mili-
tary context.4 With Goldman, however, the majority tacitly
abandoned substantive interest-balancing. Instead, the Court
has evolved an implicit standard of absolute deference to profes-
sional military judgments which, despite majority protestations
to the contrary, leaves little room for protection of servicemen's
rights.5
Background on the traditional Supreme Court role in indi-
1. 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986).
2. See, e.g., Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983) (servicemen may not maintain
suits for damages arising from alleged constitutional violations by their superior officers);
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (male-only draft registration does not violate the
Constitution); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (Air Force restriction of petitioning
and posting of printed matter on the military base does not violate servicemen's first
amendment rights); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (Army prohibition of leafletting
and political rallies on the military base without prior approval of the base commander
does not violate the first and fifth amendments); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974)
(court-martial of officer for anti-war statements to enlisted men under him was not viola-
tive of the first or fifth amendments); Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83 (1953) (doctor
who was drafted into the service and subsequently denied rank and duties appropriate to
his status as a doctor was not entitled to habeas corpus relief).
3. Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1314.
4. See supra note 2.
5. Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1313; see also id. at 1317 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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vidual rights challenges is provided in Part II. Particular atten-
tion is given to the standard of review which has been applied to
free exercise challenges in the civilian context. Although articu-
lated in various ways, the central theme of the standard is essen-
tially strict scrutiny - to be upheld, the regulation challenged
as a burden on individual freedom of religion must be the least
restrictive means of achieving some compelling governmental
objective.' Part II also examines the evolution of Supreme Court
decisions which have produced the concept of the separate com-
munity and a deferential standard of review7 for individual
rights challenges in the military context.
The facts, procedural history, and a summary of the major-
ity, concurring, and dissenting opinions in Goldman are
presented in Part III. Part IV analyzes the opinion, with partic-
ular focus given to questions raised by the Brennan and
O'Connor dissents: Has the Court abdicated its constitutional
role in military context cases? Is the civilian standard of review
a workable alternative to absolute deference in the military
6. J. Now~, R ROrUNDA. & J.N. YOUNG, CONSTrrONAL LAW § 17.6, at 1068-69 (3d
ed. 1986) [hereinafter NowAK]. See also Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1324-25 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). This balancing test is different from the entanglement test applied to free-
dom of religion challenges under the establishment clause. In the latter case, the law will
be sustained if it has a secular purpose, a primary secular effect, and it does not exces-
sively entangle government and religion. NowAm. supra §17.3, at 1033.
To determine the degree of potential entanglement, the Court examines "(1) the
character and purpose of the religious institution to be benefitted, (2) the nature of the
aid, and (3) the resulting relationship between the government and religious authorities."
Id. § 17.3 at 1033. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981):
[A] policy will not offend the Establishment Clause if it can pass a three-
pronged test: "First, the [governmental policy] must have a secular legislative pur-
pose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion ... ; finally, the [policy] must not foster 'an excessive government
entanglement with religion."'
Id. at 271 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971)); Walz v. Tax Com-
mission, 397 U.S. 664, 669 (1970) ("Each value judgment under the Religion Clauses
must therefore turn on whether particular acts in question are intended to establish...
religious beliefs and practices or have the effect of doing so."); Id. at 674 ("We must also
be sure that the end result - the effect - is not excessive government entanglement
with religion.").
7. The separate community doctrine essentially states that the military is a "dis-
tinct subculture" defined and justified by its unique mission. As the Court is reluctant to
interfere in this "mission," it accords a high degree of deference to professional military
actions. Hirschhorn, The Separate Community: Military Uniqueness and Servicemen's
Constitutional Rights, 62 N.C.L Rxv. 177, 201-03 (1984).
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context?
This Note concludes, in Part V, that the Goldman majority
has abdicated its role by implicitly abandoning substantive in-
terest-balancing in favor of absolute deference to military judg-
ment. Part V suggests, however, that reasoned interest-balancing
which applies a modified version of the civilian analysis can ac-
commodate both the individual rights of servicemen and the
special needs of the military, should the Court choose, in the
future, to reclaim its constitutional role.
II. Background
A. Judicial Review - The Court's Constitutional Role
The Constitution extends to the judiciary power over all
cases arising under the Constitution.8 Beginning with Marbury
v. Madison,9 doctrine developed which states that the Constitu-
tion is the supreme law in the United States and that "it is em-
phatically the province and duty of the judicial department to
say what the law is. ' 10 Thus a cornerstone of the American legal
system is the doctrine of judicial review - the concept that it is
the role of the Supreme Court to "determine the constitutional-
ity and, therefore, the validity of the acts of the other branches
of government . . .
As part of the separation of powers among the three
branches of government, the Constitution makes the President
Commander in Chief of the military."2 Responsibility for raising,
maintaining, and governing the military is allocated to Con-
gress."3 The Supreme Court is not expressly granted a role in
military matters; however, the military comes within the juris-
diction of the Court as a subordinate component of another gov-
ernmental branch whose actions are subject to constitutional
scrutiny by the Court."' Consequently, the military may be sub-
8. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
9. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
10. Id. at 177.
11. NOWAK, supra note 6, § 1.1, at 1.
12. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12-14.
14. Note, Judicial Review of Constitutional Claims Against the Military, 84 COLUM.
L REv. 387, 422 (1984) [hereinafter Judicial Review].
19871
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jected to constitutional scrutiny when an individual claims that
military conduct or regulation violates his constitutional rights.
The first amendment to the Constitution"s protects those
fundamental freedoms thought to be essential to the functioning
of a democratic society."' Consequently, there has been a tradi-
tional perception of first amendment freedoms as holding a spe-
cial position within the hierarchy of individual rights. 7 Recog-
nizing this, the Court has been particularly cognizant of its role
as "principal expositor of the Constitution"18 when considering
alleged government infringement of such individual rights."
B. Free Exercise of Religion: Policies and Standards of Review
Escape from European religious intolerance was among the
primary motivations for the colonization of America.20 In spite
of that fact, there were a number of colonial and early state at-
tempts to legislate religious doctrine, to tax for support of reli-
15. U.S. CONST. amend. 1: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Gov-
ernment for a redress of grievances."
16. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (on freedom of religion):
By the time of the adoption of the Constitution, our history shows that there was
a widespread awareness among many Americans of the dangers of a union of
Church and State .... The First Amendment was added to the Constitution to
stand as a guarantee that neither the power nor the prestige of the Federal Gov-
ernment would be used to control, support, or influence the kinds of prayer the
American people can say - that the people's religions must not be subjected to
the pressures of government for change each time a new political administration is
elected to office.
Id. at 429-30; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (on free speech and press): "This
court has characterized the freedom of speech and that of the press as fundamental per-
sonal rights and liberties. [The phrase] reflects the belief of the framers of the Constitu-
tion that exercise of the rights lies at the foundation of free government by free men."
Id. at 161 (footnote omitted).
17. See, e.g., Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 606 (1961) ("[W]hen entering the
area of religious freedom, we must be fully cognizant of the particular protection that the
constitution has accorded it."); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943)
("Freedom of the press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in a preferred
position.").
18. Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310, 1316 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
19. See supra note 17. See also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1879)
(stating that freedom of religious belief is absolute).
20. Kurland, The Religious Clauses and the Burger Court, 34 CATH. U.L. REV. 1, 2
(1984) (this article provides background on freedom of religion).
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol7/iss2/6
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gion, and to punish failure to worship. 2' The dual religion
clauses of the first amendment, the free exercise clause and the
establishment clause, represented a response to such attempts."2
The first major decision under the free exercise clause was
Reynolds v. United States,3 which upheld the conviction of a
Mormon on charges of bigamy. In doing so, the Court differenti-
ated between religious belief and action taken pursuant to that
belief.2 4 Holding that Congress may not legislate over "mere
opinion," the Court nonetheless found that Congress had power
to "reach actions which were in violation of social duties or sub-
versive of good order." 5 The Court reasoned that without this
restriction on religious action, government would be undermined
because religious doctrine would be superior to the law of the
land. 6
Since government regulation could permissibly reach certain
actions taken pursuant to religious belief, the Court needed tests
and standards to ensure that appropriate constitutional protec-
tion for individual rights would be maintained.7 To this end,
substantive interest-balancing has been applied in freedom of
religion cases. Examining the specific circumstances, the Court
balances the strength of the governmental interest at stake
against the religious exercise involved. 8
21. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 162 (providing historical background in decision upholding
the bigamy conviction of a Mormon).
22. Id. See Kurland, supra note 20, at 1-2.
The establishment clause states that "Congress shall make no law respecting an es-
tablishment of religion ... " and the free exercise clause adds that "Congress shall make
no law... prohibiting the free exercise thereof .. " U.S. CoNsT. amend. I. Together, the
two clauses protect individual freedom of religion. Government may not pursue religious
objectives, and it must be religiously neutral in its pursuit of secular goals, in order to
safeguard the guaranteed individual freedom. NOwAK, supra note 6, § 17.1, at 1031.
23. 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
24. Id. at 164.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 167.
27. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
28. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (governmental interest in main-
taining a viable social security system for the common good outweighs the individual's
religious belief that bars contribution to public welfare); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S.
707 (1981) (state interest in avoiding widespread unemployment was insufficient to out-
weigh individual's religion-based refusal to work in weapons manufacture); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (state interest in universal education was insufficient to out-
weigh Amish parents' preference for training their teenage children within the commu-
19871
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This process of substantive interest-balancing has articu-
lated the standard of review in a number of different ways."' On
closer examination, however, the various formulations are all
shadings of a central policy - since the express purpose of the
Bill of Rights is to protect the individual against government
tyranny, government must demonstrate an especially important
objective that would be substantially harmed by individual ex-
emptions, before it may be allowed to infringe upon a specific
Bill of Rights guarantee.0
Consequently, the Court strictly scrutinizes any such gov-
ernment action. Government must establish that the interest in-.
volved is especially important31  (or "compelling," 3' or "of the
highest order, '83 or "overriding" 3'). Government must also es-
tablish that the challenged means are narrowly tailored (or
"least restrictive," 85 or "not otherwise served,"a3 or "essential"37 )
to achieving the especially important interest.
One early approach in the evolution of this treatment ap-
peared in Cantwell v. Connecticut," which reversed the convic-
tions of Jehovah's Witnesses for soliciting money without a li-
cense while distributing religious information.3' As a standard,
the Court stated that a general regulation without room for dis-
cretion or undue burden on religious practice would be valid. 0
The regulation in Cantwell, however, allowed official discretion
nity); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (state interest in avoiding widespread un-
employment was insufficient to justify denial of unemployment benefits to individual
who refused to work on her Saturday sabbath); Braunfield v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961)
(state interest in providing a day without commercial activity outweighed orthodox Jew-
ish merchants interest in doing business on Sundays); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940) (statute allowing discretion to license solicitation based on religious content of
the message could not survive challenge on free exercise grounds).
29. See supra note 28. Different words are used to articulate the standard in each
case. See infra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
30. Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1325 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
31. Id.
32. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718; Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406.
33. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
34. Lee, 455 U.S. at 257-58.
35. Thomas, 450 U.S. at 718.
36. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
37. Lee, 455 U.S. at 257-58.
38. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
39. Id. at 311.
40. Id. at 305.
[Vol. 7:531
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to license based on the religious nature of the solicitation and
was, therefore, invalid."'
Subsequently, a three-part standard was articulated in
Braunfield v. Brown,"2 where the Court considered whether Sun-
day closing laws interfered with orthodox Jewish appellants' free
exercise rights. The Court stated that the statute is valid if: 1) it
regulates conduct, but not religious belief; 2) it advances a secu-
lar goal of the state; and 3) the state's purpose cannot be
achieved without a burden on the religious practice." In
Braunfield, the statute did not in any way restrict appellants'
belief in their sabbath or require them to forego its observance."
Rather, the closing law merely rendered that observance more
expensive by prohibiting the operation of their businesses on
Sunday."' The statute advanced the secular state goal of a day
without commercial activity, and that goal would be undermined
if an exception were allowed to orthodox Jewish merchants.'
Thus, the standard was met; the statute was held to be constitu-
tional both on its face and as applied.'7
Two years later, in Sherbert v. Verner,4 8 the Court sus-
tained a free exercise challenge, holding that denial of unem-
ployment benefits to a Seventh Day Adventist because she re-
fused, for religious reasons, to work on Saturday violated the
first amendment.' 9 Using basically the same standard, the Court
further articulated the type of state interest needed to counter-
balance the right to free exercise of religion.' 0
The Court identified the essential question as "whether
some compelling state interest . . . justifies the substantial in-
fringement of appellant's First Amendment right."" Further-
more, the Court elaborated, "[ilt is basic that no showing merely
of a rational relationship to some colorable state interest would
41. Id.
42. 366 U.S. at 603, 607.
43. Id. at 607.
44. Id. at 603.
45, Id. at 605.
46. Id. at 608.
47. Id. at 609.
48. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
49. Id. at 410.
50. Id. at 406.
51. Id.
19871
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suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area, '[o]nly the
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion
for permissible limitation.' ,,2
There was no such paramount state interest involved in
Sherbert,"5 and the statute effectively forced plaintiff to choose
between her religion and her livelihood." In addition, the stat-
ute was discriminatory because Sunday worshippers were ex-
empt from such a choice.55 Thus, the statute was
unconstitutional.
Yet another shading of the standard appeared in Wisconsin
v. Yoder,86 where the Court considered a challenge by Amish.
parents to the state's compulsory high school attendance re-
quirement. 7 The Court stated that the law would be valid only
if it did not effectively prohibit the free exercise of a religious
belief or if the state interest addressed was important enough to
outweigh the first amendment right.'8 Drawing on evolving doc-
trine, the Court stated, "[tihe essence of all that has been said
and written on the subject is that only those interests of the
highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance le-
gitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.""
Although state interest in universal education is high, the
Court found that allowing the traditional Amish practice of
training their teenage children within the Amish community
would not undercut the state interest.6 0 Compulsory public high
52. Id. (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).
53. 374 U.S. at 407.
54. Id. at 404.
55. Id. at 406.
56. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
57. Id. at 207.
58. Id. at 214.
59. Id. at 215. The Yoder Court cites, as examples, Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 459 (1961) (separate opinion of Justice
Frankfurter); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 165 (1944).
Note that the cases cited by the Yoder Court, as well as those discussed in the text
accompanying notes 23-55 provided various articulations of the appropriate standard of
review. From these, the Yoder Court distilled this formulation of the scale on which to
balance the opposing interests.
60. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 222-29. The Amish practice of training their children in the
community represents a part of and a way of perpetuating their traditional lifestyle.
Stemming from the Amish Order's literal interpretation of the biblical command "'be
not conformed to this world ... ,'" the lifestyle is a matter of strong religious belief. Id.
at 216. Consequently, as the Court noted:
[Vol. 7:531
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school attendance would produce assimilation into the main-
stream of American society and thus effectively destroy the
traditional way of life which was a matter of deep religious con-
viction to the Amish.61 Therefore, state interest in Yoder was
found to be weak, the individual interest was compelling, and
the state consequently was unable to meet the requisite stan-
dard. The statute was held unconstitutional as it applied to the
Amish."'
Finally, in Thomas v. Review Board,63 the Court considered
the challenge of a Jehovah's Witness who had quit his job be-
cause it required his participation in the manufacture of weap-
ons - a practice contrary to his religious beliefs.6 4 As in Sher-
bert, Thomas was denied unemployment benefits, and the denial
was held to be violative of his first amendment rights.6 " As in
Yoder, only the highest order of state interests was considered
sufficient to outweigh individual freedoms.66 To justify a statute
which burdens free exercise of religion, the Court stated, the
state must show "it is the least restrictive means of achieving
some compelling state interest. '' 67 Thus Thomas reformulated
the previously articulated standards into a concise expression
mirroring the traditional strict scrutiny standard for infringe-
ment of fundamental rights.
C. Individual Rights in the Military Context
Individual rights are treated differently in the military con-
text. This treatment derives from judicial recognition that the
Their way of life in a church-oriented community, separated from the outside
world and "worldly" influences, their attachment to nature and the soil, is a way
inherently simple and uncomplicated, albeit difficult to preserve against the pres-
sure to conform. Their rejection of telephones, automobiles, radios, and television,
their mode of dress, of speech, their habits of manual work do indeed set them
apart from much of contemporary society; these customs are both symbolic and
practical.
Id. at 217.
61. Id. at 215-18.
62. Id. at 234.
63. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
64. Id. at 709.
65. Id. at 719-20.
66. Id. at 718.
67. Id.
1987]
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military objective is the uniquely important governmental goal
of national security. 6" To achieve that objective, there must be
combat-readiness; to be combat-ready, the military requires ex-
traordinary levels of discipline, obedience, and training. Thus,
the argument goes, the military must be accorded a special sta-
tus as a separate society.6' This has led the Court to state re-
peatedly that while servicemen do not waive their rights upon
entry into the military, constitutional protection may be applied
differently in the military context.70
68. See Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354 (1980) ("Military personnel must be
Teady to perform their duty whenever the occasion arises."); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S.
828, 837 (1976) ("One of the very purposes for which the Constitution was ordained and
established was to 'provide for the common defense,' and this Court over the years has
on countless occasions recognized the special constitutional function of the military in
our national life .... "); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743 (1974) ("This Court has long
recognized that the military is by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian
society.... The differences between the military and civilian communities result from
the fact that 'it is the primary business of armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight
wars should the occasion arise.' "). See also Hirschhorn, supra note 7:
[T]he separate community doctrine consists of four propositions. First, as a mat-
ter of observation and history, the armed forces are a distinct subculture in which
the individual is subordinated to the organization in a manner unlike any other
government activity. Second, the existence of this peculiar relationship is evidence
that it rationally serves both the armed forces' internal purposes and the larger
society's interests. Third, when individual rights appear to conflict with the
smooth working of the armed forces, the Court distrusts its own ability to recon-
cile them without harming military effectiveness. Fourth, its exceptional reluc-
tance to intervene on behalf of judicially developed individual rights is justified
because the purpose of the armed forces, "to fight wars," is fundamentally differ-
ent from any other government activity.
Id. at 201-02.
69. See supra note 68.
70. Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983). The Court stated that:
This Court has never held, nor do we now hold, that military personnel are barred
from all redress in civilian courts for constitutional wrongs suffered in the course
of military service .... But the special relationships that define military life have
"supported the military establishment's broad power to deal with its own person-
nel ......
Id. at 304-05; Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67 (1981) ("None of this is to say that
Congress is free to disregard the Constitution when it acts in the area of military affairs.
... [B]ut the tests and limitations to be applied may differ because of the military
context."); Parker, 417 U.S. at 758 ("While members of the military are not excluded
from the protection granted by the First Amendment, the different character of the mili-
tary community and of the military mission requires a different application of those
protections.").
It should be noted, however, that the Court has been far from unanimous in its
consideration of this proposition. In Parker, for example, Justice Douglas argued that
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol7/iss2/6
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1. The Supreme Court Approach
A passage from Orloff v. Willoughby7" is characteristic of
the Court's perspective in military matters: "The military con-
stitutes a specialized community governed by a separate disci-
pline from that of the civilian. Orderly government requires that
the judiciary be as scrupulous not to interfere with legitimate
Army matters as the Army must be scrupulous not to intervene
in judicial matters. '72
Utilizing this approach in Parker v. Levy,7" the Court con-
sidered a first amendment challenge by an Army doctor who was
court-martialled, under Articles 133 and 134 of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice, for refusing to train Special Forces
aides and for making anti-Vietnam War statements to his pa-
tients.7 4 Upholding the constitutionality of Articles 133 and 134,
the majority accepted the Army's separate community and mili-
tary necessity rationales, stating:
While members of the military are not excluded from the protec-
tion granted by the First Amendment, the different character of
the military community and of the military mission requires a
different application of those protections. The fundamental ne-
the first amendment has "no preferred classes for whose benefit the First Amendment
extends, no exempt classes." Parker, 417 U.S. at 768 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Similarly,
Justice Brennan has stated that "if the recent lessons of history mean anything, it is that
the First Amendment does not evaporate with the mere intonation of interests such as
national defense, military necessity, or domestic security." Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828,
852 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting). And Justice Marshall elaborated, "[wle have never
held - and, if we remain faithful to our duty, never will hold - that the Constitution
does not apply to the military." Id. at 873 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
71. 345 U.S. 83 (1953).
72. Id. at 94. See also Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) ("[It is difficult to
conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the courts have less competence.").
73. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
74. Id. at 738 n.3 (" 'Any commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman who is con-
victed of conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman shall be punished as a court-
martial may direct.'" (quoting Article 133 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10
U.S.C. § 933)). See also Parker, 417 U.S. at 738 n.4:
"[A]ll disorders and neglects to prejudice of good order and discipline in the
armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and
crimes and offenses not capital, of which persons subject to this chapter may be
guilty, shall be taken cognizance of by a general, special, or summary court-mar-
tial, according to the nature or degree of the offense, and shall be punished at the
discretion of that court."
Td. (quoting Article 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 934).
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cessity for obedience, and the consequent necessity for imposition
of discipline, may render permissible within the military that
which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it.78
Thus Articles 133 7 and 13477 of the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice, under which Captain Levy was sentenced to three
years hard labor, were found to encompass a wide range of con-
duct without being overbroad under the first amendment. 78
Rather, the Court found that the potential harm to military in-
terest as a result of an officer encouraging disobedience of com-
bat orders clearly justifed curtailment of speech.7
In Brown v. Glines,80 the Court reviewed Air Force regula-
tions which prohibit anyone on an Air Force base or in uniform
from soliciting signatures on petitions or posting printed matter
without prior approval of the base commander.6 1 Captain Glines
had tried to petition members of Congress for assistance in re-
laxing the Air Force dress code. He was removed from active
duty as a result.8
Once again, the Court leaned heavily on the separate com-
munity rationale: "Because the right to command and the duty
to obey ordinarily must go unquestioned, this Court long ago
recognized that the military must possess substantial discretion
over its internal discipline. 8 3 On the servicemen's side of the
balance, the Court noted that military commanders may not,
under the regulations, restrict speech that only criticizes govern-
ment policy or prohibit information distribution through other
outlets.8 ' Thus, the Court engaged in a balancing analysis, but
the military point of view was accorded heavy weight in the con-
text of the instant circumstances. Captain Glines' first amend-
75. Parker, 417 U.S. at 758.
76. 10 U.S.C. § 933.
77. 10 U.S.C. § 934.
78. Parker, 417 U.S. at 760-61. Such speech "was unprotected under the most ex-
pansive notions of the First Amendment." Id.
79. Id.
80. 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
81. Id. at 349. See also Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (holding that the regula-
tion requiring base commanders' prior approval for civilian leafletting and political ral-
lies on the base did not violate the first amendment).
82. Brown, 444 U.S. at 351.
83. Id. at 357.
84. Such outlets include newsstands and the United States mail. Id. at 355.
[Vol. 7:531
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ment right to petition for change in Air Force grooming stan-
dards at Travis Air Force Base in California was outweighed by
the asserted military necessity of absolute obedience for combat-
readiness.8 5
Not all the Justices have been comfortable with the increas-
ing deference to military claims of necessity."6 In Brown, Justice
Brennan provided a strong dissent which reflected his concern
over the trend of the Court's decisions. Noting that previous de-
cisions had allowed prior restraint of speech only where severe,
war-time injury to the nation was a real prospect, he found the
justifications in Brown to be far less compelling.8 7 Where defer-
ence to military necessity was involved, Justice Brennan recom-
mended restraint:
[Tihe concept of military necessity is seductively broad, and has a
dangerous plasticity. Because they invariably have the visage of
overriding importance, there is always a temptation to invoke se-
curity "necessities" to justify an encroachment upon civil liber-
ties. For that reason, the military security argument must be ap-
proached with a healthy skepticism; its very gravity counsels that
courts be cautious when military necessity is invoked by the gov-
ernment to justify a trespass on First Amendment rights.88
Justice Brennan had no reservations concerning the Court's
85. Id. at 354-58.
86. See infra notes 87, 90 and accompanying text. See also Brown, 444 U.S. at 378
(Stewart, J., dissenting) ("And surely it cannot conceivably be argued that.., a regula-
tion requiring the preclearance of the content of all petitions to be circulated by service-
men in time of peace is 'necessary to the security of the United States.' "); Greer, 424
U.S. at 852 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[I]f the recent lessons of history mean anything, it
is that the First Amendment does not evaporate with the mere intonation of interests
such as national defense, military necessity, or domestic security."); Id. at 873 (Marshall,
J., dissenting) ("The Court, by its unblinking deference to the military's claim that the
regulations are appropriate, has sharply limited one of the guarantees that makes this
Nation so worthy of being defended. I dissent."). See also supra note 70 and accompany-
ing text.
87. Brown, 444 U.S. at 364-65 (Brennan, J., dissenting):
Thus far, only the interest in averting a virtually certain prospect of imminent,
severe injury to the Nation in time of war has been generally considered a suffi-
ciently weighty ground for prior restraint of constitutionally protected speech.
The instant regulations, however, explicitly require commanding officers to sup-
press petitioning for reasons far less urgent than imminent, serious, peril to the
United States or its citizens.
Id. (citations omitted).
88. Id. at 369.
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ability to interest-balance in military context cases. Rather, he
stated, "[t]o be sure, generals and admirals, not federal judges
are expert about military needs. But it is equally true that
judges, not military officers, possess the competence and author-
ity to interpret and apply the First Amendment." 8
Thus the Court has been divided on the handling of individ-
ual rights challenges in the military context. The majority has
continually emphasized that servicemen retain their rights in the
military.91 However, endeavors to balance those individual inter-
ests with asserted military necessity has invariably produced
deferential results.
2. Lower Federal Courts
The federal courts have often questioned the reviewability
of military rules and actions. Two approaches to dealing with
individual rights challenges in the military context have
emerged." The first has been to apply the traditional jus-
ticiability doctrine. 3 Upon a finding that the issues involved are
political in nature and best resolved by internal military judg-
ment, the doctrine requires that courts avoid offending the sepa-
ration of powers doctrine by denying reviewability." However,
in the absence of such a finding, the courts proceed to review on
the merits, balancing military interests against servicemen's
rights." Only a minority of the lower courts have employed this
89. Id. at 370.
90. Note that military context cases have often produced split results. Brown, 444
U.S. 348; Parker, 417 U.S. 733; and Orloff, 345 U.S. 83, were all five-to-three decisions.
91. See supra note 70.
92. See Judicial Review, supra note 14, at 387.
93. Id.
94. Gertzog, Federal Judicial Review of Military Administrative Decisions, 51 GEo.
WASH. L. Rav. 612, 616-17, 618-19 (1983); Judicial Review, supra note 14, at 402-03;
NOWAK, supra note 6, § 2.15, at 109-10.
95. Dillard v. Brown, 652 F.2d 316 (3d Cir. 1981):
The rights enjoyed by those in the military community do not correspond identi-
cally to those enjoyed by civilians.... Each constitutional claim must be evalu-
ated in relation to the specific military justification alleged.... If the military
justification outweighs the infringement of the plaintiffs individual freedom, we
may hold for the military on the merits, but we will not find the claim to be non-
justiciable and therefore not cognizable by a court
Id. at 323-24. See also Sherwood v. Brown, 619 F.2d 47 (9th Cir. 1980) (denial, on the
merits, of first amendment challenge to court martial of a Sikh for refusal to comply with
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treatment.9e
A majority of the lower courts have applied a test for re-
viewability developed in Mindes v. Seaman.' This case involved
a fifth amendment challenge to an Air Force captain's removal
from active duty on the basis of an erroneous effectiveness re-
port. Captain Mindes exhausted all available military appeals in
an effort to void the erroneous report. Subsequently, he sought
declaratory and injunctive relief in the federal courts.e8
The Fifth Circuit began by summarizing precedent in mili-
tary context cases, noting that review has been granted where
the military is alleged to have violated its own regulations, where
the constitutionality of military regulations and actions is chal-
lenged and where constitutional errors in court-martial convic-
tions are alleged. 9" However, review has been denied to service-
men challenging individual orders.'" Consequently, the Fifth
Circuit articulated the following threshold requirements for
reviewability:
[W]e have distilled the primary conclusion that a court should
not review internal military affairs in the absence of (a) an allega-
tion of the deprivation of a constitutional right, or an allegation
that the military has acted in violation of applicable statutes or
its own regulations, and (b) exhaustion of available intraservice
corrective measures. The second conclusion . . . is that not all
such allegations are reviewable. 101
The court went on to hold that if the two threshold require-
ments were met, the reviewability analysis must include four ad-
ditional factors, as follows:
1. The nature and strength of the plaintiff's challenge to the mili-
tary determination....
dress code); Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, 591 F.2d 852, 859-60 (D.C. Cir.
1978) (constitutional challenge to regulation barring homosexuals from the Air Force
found reviewable and remanded to the Air Force for explanation of the reasons behind
the regulation); Carlson v. Schlesinger, 511 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (review, on the
merits, of a first amendment challenge to regulations prohibiting servicemen in Vietnam
from petitioning members of Congress - regulation upheld as applied).
96. See Judicial Review, supra note 14, at 387, 402. See also supra note 95.
97. 453 F.2d 197 (5th Cir. 1971).
98. Id. at 198.
99. Id. at 200-01.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 201.
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2. The potential injury to the plaintiff if review is refused....
3. The type and degree of anticipated interference with the mili-
tary function....
4. The extent to which the exercise of military expertise or discre-
tion is involved.'"
Thus the Fifth Circuit attempted to standardize the approach to
military context cases by injecting specific balancing considera-
tions into the preliminary reviewability decision.
As a test for reviewability, the Mindes factors have met
with mixed reaction from courts and commentators alike.10 3 The
Supreme Court has not adopted the factors, and two circuits
have failed to follow them.1 " In Dillard v. Brown, for example,
the Third Circuit refused to adopt the Mindes factors because it
anticipated that confusion would develop from the intertwining
of justiciability concepts and the merits of the case. 0 5
Still, the majority of circuits have discerned sufficient value
in the factors to warrant their use.'"° In Penagaricano v.
Llenza,107 for example, the First Circuit applied the Mindes fac-
tors to consider the reviewability of a challenge to allegedly arbi-
102. Id. The Fifth Circuit remanded Mindes' case for balancing in light of the newly
declared factors. Id. at 202.
103. Compare Dillard v. Brown, 652 F.2d 316, 323 (3d Cir. 1981) (explicitly rejecting
the Mindes test) and cases cited supra note 95 (D.C. Circuit applying traditional jus-
ticiability standards instead of the Mindes test) with Williams v. Wilson, 762 F.2d 357
(4th Cir. 1985) (applying Mindes test to find challenge to National Guard separation
decision non-justiciable for failure to exhaust military remedies); Penagaricano v. Llenza,
747 F.2d 55 (1st Cir. 1984) (applying Mindes test to find non-justiciable a challenge to
allegedly arbitrary demotion and separation decisions by Air National Guard); Gonzales
v. Army, 718 F.2d 926 (9th Cir. 1983) (applying Mindes factors to reject review of race
discrimination challenge to delayed promotion); Nieszner v. Mark, 684 F.2d 562 (8th Cir.
1982) (applying Mindes factors to dismiss age discrimination challenge to Air Force re-
fusal to commission airmen over 35 years of age) and Lindenau v. Alexander, 663 F.2d 68
(10th Cir. 1981) (applying Mindes factors to deny reviewability of claim that National
Guard discharge decisions discriminated on the basis of marital status).
See, e.g., Gertzog, supra note 94, at 612, 617-22 (both pro and con); Haggerty, Judi-
cial Review of Military Administrative Decisions, 3 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 171, 176-96
(1976) (both pro and con); Judicial Review, supra note 14, at 400 (critical evaluation;
results of Mindes factors are not uniform and are difficult to apply); Peck, The Justices
and The Generals: The Supreme Court and Judicial Review of Military Activities, 70
Mm L. R v. 1, 61-81 (1975) (favorable evaluations).
104. The Third and D.C. Circuits. See Dillard, 652 F.2d 316; see also supra note 67.
105. Dillard, 652 F.2d at 323.
106. See cases cited supra note 103.
107. 747 F.2d 55 (1st Cir. 1984).
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trary demotion and separation decisions by the Puerto Rico Air
National Guard. The court found that plaintiff Penagaricano
had satisfied the first part of the threshold test by claiming vio-
lation of his first amendment right of association.10 8 The court
also noted that it was unnecessary to decide the exhaustion of
remedies question, since balancing of the Mindes factors would
require a holding of non-reviewability anyway.101
On the first Mindes factor, the court found that a claim of
politically motivated, arbitrary and discriminatory action was
sufficiently strong on its face to favor review.110 On the second
factor, the potential injury to plaintiff weighed weakly in his
favor."' Penagaricano had not exhausted military remedies
since those available might not have been capable of providing
the relief he sought; however, the court recognized that delay of
a dual appeal could compound the already suffered hardship of
his separation from the Guard."'
Conversely, the third Mindes factor was found to weigh
strongly against review; judicial review of routine separation de-
cisions went beyond administrative inconvenience, leaving the
military in "limbo"" and thereby "'seriously imped[ing] the
military in the performance of vital duties.' ,"14 Finally, the
court found the fourth Mindes factor to weigh heavily in favor
of the military, since demotion and separation are highly discre-
tionary matters in which the courts have traditionally accorded
deference to military expertise.1" Choosing to emphasize the
last two factors, in keeping with the judiciary's hesitancy to in-
tervene in discretionary military matters, the First Circuit held
the claim to be non-reviewable.' 1
A recent example of the application of Mindes may be
108. Id. at 61. Violation of plaintiff's first amendment right of association was al-
leged to have occurred via compulsory separation from National Guard civilian employ-
ment and military service.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 62.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 62.
113. Id. at 63.
114. Id. (quoting Mindes, 453 F.2d at 201).
115. Id. at 63.
116. Id. at 64.
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found in Khalsa v. Weinberger.1 7 Khalsa, a Sikh, was denied
enlistment by the Army because his religious beliefs would bar
him from complying with the military dress code.118 Subse-
quently, Khalsa challenged the action as violative of his rights
under the first amendment. 1'
Weighing the nature and strength of Khalsa's claim, the
Ninth Circuit noted that constitutional claims involving a dress
code are weaker than those involving personal liberty. 20 The po-
tential injury factor also weighed against Khalsa, the court rea-
soned, since there is no constitutional right to enlist in the mili-
tary." Considering the third and fourth Mindes factors.
together, the court found that these weighed against Khalsa as
well. Since enlistment decisions are highly discretionary matters,
review by the courts would represent a significant level of inter-
ference in military matters." 2 Thus, balancing of the Khalsa
facts on the Mindes "scale" produced the conclusion that
Khalsa's claim was outweighed by military interests and resulted
in a holding that Khalsa's claim was non-reviewable."2
III. The Case: Goldman v. Weinberger
A. The Facts
Simcha Goldman is a clinical psychologist and an ordained
rabbi in the orthodox Jewish religion. He was stationed at
March Air Force Base in California, where he served in the
mental health clinic."14
For three years, Goldman wore his yarmulke" 5 on the base.
117. 759 F.2d 1411 (9th Cir. 1985).
118. Sikhs are required, as part of their religion, to wear turbans, beards, long hair,
and bracelets. Army Reg. 670-1 requires soldiers to shave, cut their hair, and wear only
limited types of jewelry and headgear. Khalsa, 759 F.2d at 1412.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 1415.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 1416.
123. Id.
124. Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310, 1312 (1986).
125. The wearing of a yarmulke, or skullcap, is a means of accommodating the Jew-
ish custom of covering the head before God.
[Mlost authorities and rabbis who have issued opinions on this subject agree that
[covering the head] was not originally obligatory by law, but is a custom which has
been observed with such fidelity over the centuries that it now has the force of
[Vol. 7:531
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During that period, Goldman received no complaints about his
attire and was given outstanding performance evaluations by his
superiors. 126
In 1981, however, Goldman testified for the defense at a
court-martial while wearing his yarmulke, and the opposing
counsel complained to the hospital commander. 127 The com-
mander then notified Goldman that he was in violation of the
Air Force dress code, 28 and ordered him to refrain from wearing
the yarmulke. Goldman refused to comply. A formal reprimand
followed, threatening Goldman with court-martial. Favorable
recommendation for extension of Goldman's active service was
withdrawn.12 9
As a result of these actions, Goldman sued the Secretary of
Defense, claiming that the prohibition, as applied, violated his
right to free exercise of religion under the first amendment.130
B. Lower Court Opinions
At trial before the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, the Air Force testified that strict enforcement
of the dress code was essential for maintenance of morale and
obedience.' s' Goldman, on the other hand, presented testimony
that morale would be enhanced by a more flexible military atti-
tude and that the Air Force had in fact made medical exceptions
to the dress code in the past.'
In the absence of empirical studies to prove the effect of
law....
As a result, it has become law, at least in our times, that to say any prayer or
blessing, the head must be covered; and since observant Jews say blessings
throughout the day, the head is kept covered at all times. This has acquired, in
addition, the connotation of respect for God in general and the covered head and
observance of the Torah have become synonymous.
M. ASHERI, LIVING JEWISH: THE LORE AND LAW OF THE PRACTICING JEW, 120 (1978).
126. Goldman v. Secretary of Defense, 734 F.2d 1531, 1533 (D.C. Cir. 1984), aff'd
sub nom. Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310 (1986).
127. Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1312.
128. Id. Air Force Reg. 35-10 requires servicemen to wear uniforms while on duty
and prohibits the wearing of headgear indoors.
129. Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1312.
130. Id.
131. Goldman, 734 F.2d at 1533-35.
132. Id. at 1535. Medical exceptions from shaving requirements had been allowed to
those suffering from pseudofolliculitis barbae (ingrown facial hair).
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religious exemptions on morale and obedience, the district court
was unconvinced by Air Force arguments. 13 3 Finding the yar-
mulke neither obtrusive nor an interference with Goldman's
work, the court issued a permanent injunction to prevent the Air
Force from prohibiting or punishing Goldman's religious
observance. 13 4
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
reversed and vacated the injunction.1 35 The court found neither
the strict scrutiny standard advocated by Goldman, nor the ra-
tional basis standard advocated by the Air Force to be appropri-
ate. 3' Rejecting the need for any interest-balancing, the court
found it was restricted to a two-fold inquiry: 1) whether there
are "legitimate military ends" addressed by the challenged regu-
lation, and 2) whether the regulations are "designed to accom-
modate the individual right to an appropriate degree. 13
The court found that because of the unique military interest
in uniformity and obedience, strict enforcement is a legitimate
military end in itself, and the cutoff point for accommodation of
individual rights is necessarily arbitrary.3 8 The wearing of a yar-
mulke was a religious observance beyond the arbitrary cutoff
point of visibility.'" Thus, the court found, the Air Force could
refuse to grant a religious exemption from the dress code with-
out violating the individual's constitutional rights.14 0
Subsequently, petition for rehearing en banc was denied by
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 1541.
136. Id. at 1536.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 1540.
[The military's interest] lies in the enforcement of regulations, not for the sake of
the regulations themselves, but for the sake of enforcement .... It is impossible to
argue, for example, that a decorative hat of one shape or one color is demonstrably
superior to another, although it is possible to argue that enforcement of rules that
certain hats may be worn only by certain people or at certain times serves the
military purposes of identification and indoctrination into instinctive obedience.
Id.
139. Id. The wearing of a non-uniform item which could be seen by an observer fell
on the unacceptable side of the arbitrary cutoff point, while that which could not be seen
(e.g., a cross worn under the uniform) was acceptable.
140. Id. at 1540-41.
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the full Court of Appeals, with three dissents."" Goldman peti-
tioned the United States Supreme Court for a writ of
certiorari. " "
C. The Supreme Court
1. The Majority
In a five-to-four decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the
judgment of the court of appeals, holding that "those portions of
the regulations challenged here reasonably and evenhandedly
regulate dress in the interest of the military's perceived need for
uniformity," and that "[t]he First Amendment therefore does
not prohibit them from being applied to petitioner even though
their effect is to restrict the wearing of headgear required by re-
ligious beliefs."'"3 Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist
acknowledged Goldman's argument for application of civilian
free exercise standards of review, but then turned without fur-
ther comment to the "separate society" analysis.'" Thus the
only factor cited by the majority as distinguishing the instant
case from other free exercise precedent was the military context
in which it occurred."
Citing such cases as Brown v. Glines," Parker v. Levy,"7
and Orloff v. Willoughby,"8 the majority summarized the doc-
trine that the military is a special society characterized by ex-
traordinary requirements for discipline and "esprit de corps";
that this status exists by virtue of the military's unique purpose;
and that this special status justifies differential treatment of in-
dividuals in the military and civilian communities.14 9 As a result,
the majority stated, "[o]ur review of military regulations chal-
lenged on First Amendment grounds is far more deferential than
constitutional review of similar laws or regulations designed for
141. Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1312.
142. Id. at 1311.
143. Id. at 1314.
144. Id. at 1312-13.
145. Id. at 1312-14.
146. 444 U.S. 348 (1980).
147. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
148. 345 U.S. 83 (1953). See also cases cited supra notes 68-76.
149. Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1313.
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civilian society." 80
Pursuing this framework for analysis, the majority noted
that first amendment guarantees are not rendered valueless to
servicemen. 151 Nonetheless, the majority emphasized a lack of
judicial competence to evaluate specific challenges to matters of
military necessity."2 Furthermore, Congress and the President
have delegated power over military matters to military authori-
ties. 58 Thus, the majority concluded, "when evaluating whether
military needs justify a particular restriction on religiously moti-
vated conduct, courts must give great deference to the profes-
sional judgment of military authorities concerning the relative
importance of a particular military interest."'"
Having thus articulated the deferential standard, the major-
ity summarized the military argument as follows. According to
military professionals, uniformity helps subordinate individual
identity to the needs of the military, thereby promoting disci-
pline and establishing obedience - traits which are required of
servicemen by the necessity of combat-readiness. To this end,
the dress code stresses uniformity, allowing only limited individ-
ual choice in jewelry, hair style, and nonvisible religious items."6
The majority noted Goldman's arguments that the Air Force
had failed to prove any real threat to discipline from the re-
quested exception and that the granting of religious exceptions
would in fact improve morale." 7 However, Goldman's arguments
were dismissed by the majority as "besides the point.""
Instead, the majority concluded, such determinations are
left to military professional judgment.1" There is no constitu-
tional obligation to make exceptions, even when the outcome is a
burden on the free exercise of religion.160 Thus the regulations
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 1314.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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did not violate Goldman's first amendment rights. 16'
2. The Concurrence
Justice Stevens' concurrence began with acknowledgment
that Goldman's case was particularly appealing.63 However, Jus-
tice Stevens' analysis proceeded from the concept that the regu-
lation must be evaluated in the broader context of all service-
men who claim exception on grounds of religious beliefs. 63
Viewed in that light, the uniformity interest was seen to
have two dimensions. First, there was the legitimate Air Force
interest in uniformity recognized by the Court majority.'" How-
ever, Stevens also recognized a constitutional "interest in uni-
form treatment for the members of all religious faiths."1 5
Justice Stevens believed that an exception for Goldman
would lead to disparate treatment of more unusual religious
practices;166 balancing of a desired exception against impairment
of military function would inevitably implicate majority group
reaction to practices of minority faiths. The Air Force dress
code, however, is based on the neutral criterion of visibility of
the desired item; thus, Justice Stevens concluded, it must be up-
held in order to preserve true uniformity of treatment.167
3. The Dissents
a. Justice Brennan
In. a particularly strong dissent, Justice Brennan stated,
"[tihe Court's response to Goldman's request is to abdicate its
role as principal expositor of the Constitution and protector of
individual liberties in favor of credulous deference to unsup-
ported assertions of military necessity."'' 6 Emphasizing the free
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1314 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting the genuineness of Goldman's be-
liefs and the possible "retaliatory motive" in the enforcement measures here).
163. Id. at 1315.
164. Id. at 1315-16.
165. Id. at 1316.
166. Id. (such as turbans for Sikhs or dreadlocks for Rastafarians).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1316 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall joined in both Brennan's
and O'Connor's dissents.
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exercise basis for Goldman's claim, Brennan observed that the
Air Force regulation required Goldman to violate his religious
beliefs every day.1 9 Yet despite the presence of a substantial
constitutional issue and protestations that servicemen are not
stripped of their constitutional rights, the majority failed to pro-
vide any reasoned analysis in its decision. 170 Rather, Brennan
charged, the Court has adopted "a subrational-basis standard,"
according absolute deference to the military point of view.171
Instead of such abdication, Brennan advocated a process of
reasoned judicial review in which the court would assess 1) the
strength of the military interest; 2) the likelihood that the re-
quested exception would interfere with military interests; and 3)
the credibility of assertions that the regulation will protect those
interests.1 7 2 Factors such as professionalism, "functional utility,
[and] health and safety . . . " might be considered. 17  In this
manner, Brennan concluded, the Court could give deference to
legitimate military judgments and still ensure that the burden
on individual rights for purposes of military necessity has a ra-
tional foundation. 1
74
b. Justice Blackmun
Justice Blackmun's dissent focused on the government's
failure to establish impairment of its interests by either an ex-
ception for Goldman or by cumulative effect if such exceptions
are allowed.1 75 First, Blackmun stated that the proper standard
against which to evaluate a restriction on religious freedom is
that the burden is justifiable only if it is "'the least restrictive
means of achieving some compelling state interest.' "176 Next,
Blackmun affirmed the concept that servicemen "do not forfeit
169. Id. at 1317.
170. Id.
171. Id. Brennan stated, "[i]f a branch of the military declares one of its rules suffi-
ciently important to outweigh a service person's constitutional rights, it seems that the
Court will accept that conclusion, no matter how absurd or unsupported it may be." Id.
172. Id. at 1318-21.
173. Id. at 1319.
174. Id. at 1321.
175. Id. at 1322 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
176. Id. (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981)). This is a strict scru-
tiny standard of review.
[Vol. 7:531
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol7/iss2/6
GOLDMAN v. WEINBERGER
their constitutional rights as a price of enlistment. 1 77 But de-
spite acknowledgment that the separate community status of the
military might warrant differential application of the first
amendment, Blackmun found it unnecessary to define a differ-
ent test here. 78
Although Blackmun agreed that the Court should defer to
reasoned military judgment, Blackmun found no empirical sup-
port here for the military position. There was no evidence that,
in the event Goldman's exception was granted, a flood of similar
requests would follow - or that it would be impossible to deny
some of those requests based on reasoned analysis and neutral
distinctions. 79 Thus, Blackmun concluded that Goldman was
entitled to prevail because the Air Force failed to meet the
threshold of a "minimally credible explanation.' 80
c. Justice O'Connor
Justice O'Connor dissented on the basis of the majority's
failure to establish a standard of review for free exercise chal-
lenges in the military context.' 8' Like Justice Brennan, Justice
O'Connor criticized the absolute deference to assertions of mili-
tary necessity. 82
Reviewing the standards for civilian context cases, Justice
O'Connor noted that even in that simpler setting, the Court had
lacked clarity in articulating a single standard.' 8 3 Nonetheless,
O'Connor identified two principles which must be incorporated
into any standard the Court may develop in this area. First,
where there is an explicit Bill of Rights interest at stake, govern-
ment must establish that its countervailing interest is of particu-
lar importance to justify the infringement.'84 Second, because
the Bill of Rights was intended to protect individual rights
against governmental action, government must also establish
that its interest would be substantially impaired if the individ-
177. Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1322 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 1322-23.
179. Id. at 1323.
180. Id. at 1323-24.
181. Id. at 1324 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 1324, 1326.
183. Id. at 1324. See also supra notes 28-67 and accompanying text.
184. Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1325 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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ual prevails. 66
According to Justice O'Connor, the standards 6 articulated
in the civilian context, free exercise cases are flexible enough to
accommodate these principles and the special needs of the mili-
tary.1 87 O'Connor said that initially, the Court should assess the
relative importance of the asserted governmental interest, taking
into account at this stage the unique purpose of the military. 8'
However, she added, the strength of the individual interest at
stake requires a second step. Thus the Court must also ask
whether granting the requested exception would substantially
harm the overriding governmental interest.18 9
Justice O'Connor concluded that in Goldman's case, the
government failed on this second part of the test for several rea-
sons. By granting exceptions to the regulation, the Air Force
contradicted the compelling nature of the need for uniformity.
1 90
The Air Force also failed to show that the conduct at issue
would in any way endanger health or safety or provoke objec-
tions from Goldman's fellow servicemen."' Consequently, Jus-
tice O'Connor concluded, allowing Goldman to wear his yar-
mulke on duty posed no threat of substantial harm to
compelling military interests, and, in the balance, the govern-
ment's interest should have yielded." In summary, Justice
O'Connor reflected,
Napoleon may have been correct to assert that, in the military
sphere, morale is to all other factors as three is to one, but contra-
dicted assertions of necessity by the military do not on the scales
of justice bear a similarly disproportionate weight to sincere reli-
gious beliefs of the individual.1"
185. Id.
186. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
187. Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1325 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
188. Id.
189 Id. at 1325-26.
190. Id. at 1326.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
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IV. Analysis
With Goldman, the Court implicitly abdicates its role as ar-
biter of the Constitution for future cases arising in the military
context. 194 Goldman is the latest increment in a line of prece-
dent according an ever-increasing deference to military asser-
tions of necessity.
Individual rights challenges in the military context have
never been treated with the same degree of interest-balancing
analysis as those in the civilian context.198 Earlier cases did ex-
hibit a form of interest-balancing which offered some analysis of
the relationship between the individual's interest and the as-
serted military interests. In Orloff v. Willoughby,1 9 for example,
the Court discussed the question of what rights Orloff was enti-
tled to as a doctor drafted into the service and the impact of his
refusal to take a loyalty oath. In Brown v. Glines,97 the Court
examined the degree to which Glines' speech was impaired by
the challenged regulation. And in Chappell v. Wallace,198 the
Court discussed alternative grievance procedures available to en-
listed men before denying them a cause of action against supe-
rior officers for constitutional violations.
In Goldman, however, the majority decision is void of any
evaluation of the nature, relative importance, or degree of im-
pairment of Goldman's constitutional rights. The majority
merely restated, without question, the military position on disci-
pline, uniformity, and military necessity. The most deferential
3tatements from the precedential cases were excerpted and
cited; the only explanation offered to distinguish this case from
other free exercise cases was the military context in which it oc-
curred. Although the majority continued to assert that military
personnel are protected by the first amendment,1 99 it failed to
provide a glimmer of how this might be accomplished.
The majority decision in Goldman creates a single ines-
capable conclusion: the standard to be applied to individual
194. Goldman v. Weinberger, 106 S. Ct. 1310, 1316 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
195. See supra notes 28-89 and accompanying text.
196. 345 U.S. 83, 90-92 (1953). See supra notes 2, 71-72 and accompanying text.
197. 444 U.S. 348, 355 (1980). See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text.
198. 462 U.S. 296, 302 (1982). See supra notes 2 & 70.
199. Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1310-14.
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rights challenges in the military context will henceforth be one
of absolute deference. While the Court only goes so far as to ex-
press a standard of "great deference, "200 the unwillingness to an-
alyze the individual's interest or to provide some framework in
which the individual interest might have any chance to prevail
makes clear the Court's implicit message. As Justice Brennan
stated, "[t]he Court and the military have refused these service-
men their constitutional rights; we must hope that Congress will
correct this wrong. '20 1
There are some recommendations that can be made for a
future in which the Court could decide to reclaim its constitu-
tional role. As Justice O'Connor suggested, the standard articu-
lated in civilian free exercise cases is flexible enough to accom-
modate the special needs of the military context.202 The Court
would then ask whether there is a compelling military interest,
addressed in the least restrictive means possible, to justify the
military burden on individual rights. 03 It would be necessary to
fully weigh the relative interests at stake, to assess the degree of
impairment of military interest by the individual right asserted,
and to evaluate the accommodation of individual rights under
the challenged regulation.20 4
Clearly, this is an area that offers no easy answers. The
Court, lacking the self-confidence to evaluate military necessity,
has simply become more deferential. The dissents have decried
the failure to balance all the vital interests involved.205 And the
lower courts have often denied reviewability to avoid the diffi-
cult evaluations on the merits.2 0'
Thus, a more refined approach to the civilian test may be
required as well; to accommodate the various concerns, a de-
tailed line of analysis is in order. The needed refinement may
exist in the factors articulated by the Mindes court.207 Although
200. Id. at 1313.
201. Id. at 1322 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
202. Id. at 1325 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
203. Id. See also supra notes 28-67 and accompanying text.
204. Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1325-26 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
205. See supra notes 86-89, 168-93 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 103.
207. Mindes v. Seaman, 453 F.2d 197, 201-02 (5th Cir. 1971). See supra notes 97-102
and accompanying text.
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developed as a test for reviewability, the factors could provide a
framework for reasoned interest-balancing on the merits.
Applying the Mindes factors to Goldman's case, for exam-
ple, it is clear that a different balance would result. As to the
first factor, "the nature and strength of the plaintiff's chal-
lenge"208 weighs heavily in Goldman's favor. Clearly, assertions
of governmental interference with freedom of religion - one of
this country's most fundamental freedoms - is of the very
highest nature. As Justice Brennan stated, "[t]hrough our Bill of
Rights, we pledged ourselves to attain a level of human freedom
and dignity that had no parallel in history. Our constitutional
commitment to religious freedom and acceptance of religious
pluralism is one of our greatest achievements in that noble en-
deavor. 20 9 Since the Air Force dress code left no room for Cap-
tain Goldman's religious observance - a practice that in no
way endangered or intruded upon his fellow service-
men - Goldman's challenge was strong indeed.
Similarly, "the potential injury to the plaintiff'2 10 weighs in
favor of Goldman. The Air Force dress code precludes Rabbi
Goldman from wearing his yarmulke while on duty or in uni-
form - effectively a total prohibition of this observance of
deep religious conviction.2" The only alternatives are for
Goldman to resign his career in the military or face court-mar-
tial. As in Sherbert v. Verner21' and Thomas v. Review Board,'213
the individual is forced to choose between his religion and his
livelihood - a burden forbidden by the Court in the civilian
context.21
Furthermore, it is a choice not forced upon all other reli-
208. Mindes, 453 F.2d at 201.
209. Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1321 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
210. Mindes, 453 F.2d at 201.
211. See supra note 125.
212. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
213. 450 U.S. 707 (1981). See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
214. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1980):
Here, as in Sherbert, the employee was put to a choice between fidelity to reli-
gious belief or cessation of work; the coercive impact on Thomas is indistinguish-
able from Sherbert, where the Court held: "[Niot only is it apparent that appel-
lant's declared ineligibility for benefits derives solely from the practice of her
religion, but the pressure upon her to forego that practice is unmistakable."
Id. at 717. (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963)). See also supra notes
49-55, 63-67 and accompanying text.
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gious groups in the military context. A cross or a ring with reli-
gious significance could be worn, for example, without incurring
military disciplinary action.21 6 Thus the constitutional require-
ment of government neutrality toward religion" is ignored here.
The potential injury to Goldman from strict enforcement of
the regulation is severe. He is discriminated against because of
his religious denomination, and he must choose between patriot-
ism and religious conviction, between chosen livelihood and reli-
gious observance.
The third Mindes factor favors Goldman as well. The type
of interference with the military function is merely a minor vari-
ation from the dress code. Such exceptions are already granted
for a specific medical condition 217 and for unobtrusive items of
jewelry.2 18 As Justice O'Connor observed, the very existence of
such exceptions contradicts the military's asserted requirements
for total uniformity.2 1'
Similarly, the degree of interference with military function
appears to be de minimus. Goldman functioned in his role as Air
Force psychologist for three years wearing his yarmulke. There
were no complaints of disruptions at the military hospital. Con-
sistently positive effectiveness reports were filed on Goldman
during that time. It is difficult to see how any interference with
military discipline, obedience, or morale resulted from
Goldman's behavior.
Finally, on the fourth Mindes factor - "the extent to
which the exercise of military expertise or discretion is in-
volved" 220  _ the balance is less clear. While the matters of mil-
itary discipline, obedience, and morale are normally within the
sphere of military expertise, Goldman's conduct appears to have
had no impact on discipline. Moreover, Goldman's assertion of
an individual right is far removed from any potential sphere of
combat that might justify broadening the realm of military dis-
cretion. Since the military has not seen fit to provide studies
supporting its assertions, it is difficult to evaluate the extent to
215. Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1320 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
216. See supra note 22.
217. See supra note 132.
218. See Goldman, 106 S. Ct. at 1319 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 1326 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
220. Mindes, 453 F.2d at 201.
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which military expertise is contradicted here. Unsupported
claims of military necessity should not alone be sufficient.
In sum, the Mindes factors can provide a sensitive scale on
which to balance the military and individual interests at stake.
Applying them to the Goldman facts, they indicate that the mil-
itary interest, while compelling, cannot outweigh the individual
interest here, because the regulation has not been applied in the
least restrictive means possible. Exceptions to uniformity have
been granted in the past for medical reasons and for certain jew-
elry choices. Surely, then, exceptions should be granted in
Goldman-type circumstances, where there is insufficient evi-
dence of military necessity to justify governmental infringement
of a fundamental individual right.
V. Conclusion
Where fundamental individual rights are at stake, absolute
deference to declarations of military necessity is inappropriate.
Yet the Court has applied an implicit standard of absolute def-
erence by failing to fully evaluate unsupported military asser-
tions and by failing to balance, in any reasoned analysis, the in-
dividual's point of view. Thus in military context cases, the
Court has wrongly abandoned its traditional role as ultimate ar-
biter of the Constitution.
To resume its proper role, the Court must once again engage
in substantive interest-balancing which fully considers the con-
cerns of both parties. The Mindes factors, applied to the merits
on a case-by-case basis, can refine the balancing process to more
thoroughly accommodate individual rights and the special needs
of the military mission.
Susan Anisfield Vallario
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